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A FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIBLE AID TO BURUNDI 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Within the last two months, thanks to the active 
engagement of the facilitation team, Burundi’s peace 
process has exceeded expectations. Momentum has 
never been so strong since the civil war began ten 
years ago. On 3 December 2002, the transitional 
government led by President Buyoya signed a 
landmark ceasefire agreement with the Conseil 
national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces 
de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) of Jean-
Pierre Nkurunziza. This complemented the ceasefire 
reached two months earlier with two minor rebel 
groups (the CNDD-FDD faction led by Jean-Bosco 
Ndayikengurukiye and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
faction led by Alain Mugabarabona). On 27 January 
2003, the government and the three rebel groups 
signed an additional memorandum of understanding 
establishing a Joint Ceasefire Commission and 
setting a date for the return of Mugarabona and 
Ndayikengurukiye to Burundi. An African Union 
force with South African, Ethiopian and Mozambican 
troops is to be deployed in the next few weeks.  
For months the absence of a ceasefire was used by 
the international community as an excuse not to 
resume aid and by the transitional government to 
justify not implementing the reforms demanded by 
the Arusha peace accords signed in August 2000. 
Donors have also demanded progress in Arusha 
implementation to release aid, while the government 
has claimed it needs money to carry out the political 
reforms. Now that a ceasefire is in place, most 
donors argue that they first want to see a complete 
stop of the violence and the changeover from 
President Buyoya to Vice President Ndayizeye go as 
scheduled on 1 May 2003 before they open their 
purses. This prudence, however, has become 
counter-productive.  
True, Burundi is not yet stable. The transitional 
government has not implemented the Arusha reforms; 
the PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Agathon Rwasa still 
rejects the talks; a comprehensive reform of the 
security sector remains to be agreed upon, and the 
disarmament and cantonment process has not yet 
started. Marginal violence by Hutu rebels and 
resistance to change among the Tutsi oligarchy will 
likely remain strong even with a comprehensive 
ceasefire. But ICG believes that now is the time for 
donors to play their essential role in building peace. 
The delivery of peace dividends will signal their 
commitment to the process, give the CNDD-FDD 
fighters an incentive to accept the disarmament and 
reintegration process (DDRRR) and the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL an incentive to negotiate. It will 
also give donors the necessary leverage to pressure 
the transitional government on reforms. Political 
support for the May presidential changeover and 
responsible, well-controlled and coordinated aid can 
isolate spoilers, help consolidate the credibility of the 
transitional government, and fuel positive change. 
The Burundian people, economy, and state structures 
have suffered heavily from a decade of fighting, a 
three-year embargo, drought, the abandonment of 
much of the population by the state, and a 66 per cent 
decrease in international aid. GDP fell by 20 per cent 
in this period and is third from the bottom in the 
2002 UN human development index; primary school 
enrolment dropped in the same period from 70 per 
cent to 28 per cent, and infant mortality is back to its 
1960 level. The end of the war requires the 
reintegration into a traumatised and disorganised 
society of 70,000 ex-combatants, the cost of which 
the World Bank estimates at U.S.$90 million, as well 
as of 1.2 million refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). 
That more national donor cooperation is feasible at 
this stage has been demonstrated by the success of 
substantial community development and 
reconstruction programs (schools, health centres, 
homes, water sources) run by UNDP, the World 
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Bank, and the EU. The UN and the transitional 
government are preparing plans for reconstruction 
and the reintegration of refugees, and some early 
peacebuilding programs are expanding rapidly. The 
EU funded distribution of food to the rebels in 
December 2002 so that they would stop preying on 
civilians – a specific example of how the 
international community can directly advance the 
peace process. Reform-minded individuals within 
the transitional government need international support 
to push change forward. Burundians are desperate 
for resources and are likely to accept the structural 
reforms necessary to receive this assistance if it is 
tangible and at hand. In return donors should demand 
a reduction in military expenditure and an immediate 
cessation of speculation on coffee income and 
monetary exchange.  
A donor coordination unit should be established in 
Burundi to liaise with the transitional government 
in developing a joint strategy for implementing 
Protocol IV of the Arusha Agreement, which 
provides a roadmap for economic aspects of the 
post-conflict period. 
Nelson Mandela said, at the first donors conference 
in December 2000, that “It must be possible for the 
people of Burundi to materially distinguish between 
the destructiveness of conflict and the benefits of 
peace.” It is time to pick up the leadership mantle 
that Mandela passed to donors and the UN. As the 
facilitator of the new ceasefire accord, Jacob Zuma, 
said in December 2002, “Regional efforts had 
achieved much progress in Burundi, but a complete 
peace could not be achieved without the full support 
of the international community”. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
A. Priority Actions  
To Donors: 
1. Provide immediately the resources necessary for: 
(a) the deployment of the African Observer 
Mission, as requested by the UN Security 
Council on 30 January 2003; 
(b) the work of the ceasefire implementation 
commission; and  
(c) the sustainability and expansion of food 
distributions to rebel groups. 
2. Give the Burundi chapter of the Great Lakes 
Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Program (MDRP) the resources needed for the 
demobilisation and reintegration of over 70,000 
former combatants.  
3. Provide resources for reintegrating 1.2 million 
refugees and IDPs and increase the capacity of 
the transitional government, UN, and NGO to 
monitor the integration. 
4. Monitor military expenditures, speculation on 
coffee revenue and on monetary exchange. 
5. Establish a taskforce of Burundian and 
international economists to outline steps for 
restructuring and opening the economy, 
including: 
(a) privatisation of state assets; 
(b) jobs creation through micro-credit 
programs, high-intensity manual labour, 
and reconstruction projects;  
(c) new accountability structures in the state 
through fiscal reform; and 
(d) support for the role of private business and 
entrepreneurs in national reconstruction. 
6. Support immediate reconstruction in all areas 
where security permits, making critical use of 
the transitional government’s National 
Reconstruction Program. 
7. Develop a realistic decentralisation plan that 
integrates all efforts underway. 
8. Harmonise World Bank, EU and UNDP 
community-based reconstruction programs to 
reinforce decentralisation mechanisms and 
insist on true community involvement in 
identifying priorities. 
9. Support immediate reconstruction of the 
education system, including correction of 
imbalances in access to primary, secondary 
and higher education, and provide support for 
the education costs of disadvantaged children. 
10. Develop training programs and schools for 
professionals such as public servants, teachers, 
medical staff, and accountants. 
11. Support comprehensive reform of the judicial 
system. 
12. Ensure equal ethnic opportunities for local 
subcontractors and positions in NGOs and UN 
agencies. 
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B. Actions to Create a Framework for Improving 
Assistance Cooperation with Burundi 
To Donors: 
13. Develop a donor coordination unit, with a 
secretariat to:  
(a) create a joint strategy for the transition 
period based on the objectives of Protocol 
IV of the Arusha Agreement;  
(b) integrate the existing donor programs 
(World Bank, IMF, EU, UN, national) and 
strategies under this framework;  
(c) work with the government to revise its 
interim Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan 
(IPRSP) in accordance with the overall 
donor strategy and Protocol IV;  
(d) analyse jointly with the transitional 
government the capacity of UN agencies, 
NGOs, and communities to implement 
the strategy;  
(e) monitor implementation of the joint 
strategy and the Arusha Agreement;  
(f) act as interlocutor for the Inter-Ministerial 
Monitoring Commission for Economic 
and Social Policy (CIPES) that the 
government has created to replace the 
Reconstruction and Development Unit 
outlined in Protocol IV. 
(g) develop and monitor “aid-for-peace 
bargains” with the transitional government 
based on specific objectives of the Arusha 
Agreement;  
(h) institute a regular conflict impact 
assessment mechanism as part of the 
program monitoring system;  
(i) keep the transitional government informed 
of what money will be available, when, 
and what it must do to receive it; and 
(j) evaluate the transitional government’s 
capacity to carry out the National 
Reconstruction Program, and the Interim 
Strategy for Economic Expansion and 
Poverty Reduction, presented at the Donor 
Roundtable 27-28 November 2002 and 
support their implementation in all possible 
areas.  
To the Transitional Government: 
14. Strengthen the Inter-Ministerial Monitoring 
Commission for Economic and Social Policy 
so that it can be an effective interlocutor for 
the donor coordination unit and the UN 
Reintegration Unit. 
15. Develop all plans listed in Protocol IV, including 
reintegration of IDPs and economic and 
political reconstruction during the transitional, 
medium and long-term periods. 
16. Establish immediately the National Commission 
for the Reintegration of Sinistrés (IDPs) and the 
sub-commission on land, clarify the terms of 
the Ministry for Reconstruction, Reintegration 
and Repatriation’s supervision, entrench good 
governance and transparency mechanisms in its 
operational structures and clarify the division in 
responsibilities between it and the Inter-
Ministerial Commission for the Monitoring and 
Economic and Social Policy.  
17. Develop a reintegration policy to protect the 
rights of all Burundians, both refugees and 
internally displaced, as well as of the 
communities that will receive them.  
To the Implementation Monitoring Committee 
(IMC) and UN Agencies: 
18. Develop a joint UN strategy to support 
implementation of the Arusha Agreement.  
19. Request technical support from donors and 
other UN agencies to strengthen the IMC’s 
capacity to fulfil its mandate to “follow up, 
monitor, supervise, coordinate and ensure the 
effective implementation of all the provisions 
of the Agreement”. 
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 February 2003 
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A FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIBLE AID TO BURUNDI 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The signing of a peace accord can mark a watershed 
in the transition from war to peace, or merely a brief 
respite from violent conflict. External aid cannot 
guarantee a lasting peace, but it can help to make 
this outcome more likely. How well aid serves this 
purpose depends not only on its quantity but also on 
its qualities: what types of aid are provided, to 
whom, and what conditions are attached. 
James K. Boyce1  
The international community’s complete engagement 
is desperately needed to move Burundi from war to 
peace. The country must not lose the opportunity 
created by the landmark ceasefire agreement of 3 
December 2002 between the government and the 
Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – 
Forces de défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) 
of Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza, and the memorandum of 
understanding on the implementation of the ceasefire 
concluded on 27 January 2003 between the 
government and the three rebel groups that have thus 
far entered the peace process. South Africa, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia have committed troops to 
the African Union observer force that is expected to 
be deployed in the next few weeks. A ceasefire 
agreement with the last rebel group (the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL of Agathon Rwasa) is the final 
piece necessary to allow the full implementation of 
the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation 
signed on 28 August 2000.2 
The international community must support these 
landmark steps with the release of all promised 
 
 
1 James K. Boyce, Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality 
after Civil Wars, The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Adelphi Paper 351 (London, September 2002), p. 73. 
2 For discussion of the Burundian rebel movements, see ICG 
Africa Briefing, The Burundi Rebellion and the Ceasefire 
Negtoations, 6 August 2002. 
assistance and its commitment to break the cycles of 
violence and desperation by reconstructing a 
functioning state. The reluctance of the transitional 
government and the donor community alike to move 
from these agreements (peace-making) to their full 
implementation (peacebuilding) threatens to 
disintegrate the entire peace process.3 
Ceasefire accords with the major rebel groups have 
made full implementation of Arusha even more 
urgent. Visible peace dividends will provide an 
essential incentive for the rebels to maintain the 
ceasefire. A large influx of money is needed to 
prepare for the reintegration of former combatants, 
refugees, and internally displaced persons, financially 
support the formation of a broader government 
coalition and begin reconstruction of the social and 
economic infrastructure of a country that has greatly 
suffered from nearly a decade of civil war. 
Yet, it is necessary to make sure that the resumption 
of aid becomes a second engine of the peace process, 
not an alternative to reforms. Before the war, 
Burundi was the darling of international financial 
institutions thanks to its superficial democratisation 
process. This time around, mistakes should not be 
repeated. The objective of the peace process is not to 
replace one rent-seeking oligarchy by another. It is to 
change the system of governance that led to the war 
and of which aid programs were a key component. 
The physical and human reconstruction of the state 
is a necessity. But in reconstructing its capacities, aid 
must also be used to create a state that serves its 
people and not only its rulers, old or new, and that 
breaks from practices that led to violence in the past. 
Old habits die hard, and donors together with the 
Burundian government have much to do to set-up a 
system of good governance. 
 
 
3 It contradicts the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement signed in 
June 2000 between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
and the EU that ensures a stronger link between development 
and conflict prevention, management and resolution (see 
Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement). 
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ICG proposes a Framework for Responsible Aid and 
outlines a conditionality strategy to give momentum 
to the reform process and help Burundi out of war 
into peace. 
II. THE NEED FOR RESPONSIBLE AID 
Rather than a definitive end to war, an accord 
should be seen as a tentative step towards peace. It 
marks the beginning of a new stage in the war-to-
peace transition typically referred to as 
‘peacebuilding’. The peace accord is at best a rough 
blueprint, with the final outcome uncertain. Whether 
a lasting peace will be constructed depends crucially 
on what happens next. 
James K. Boyce4 
A. AN URGENT ENGAGEMENT FOR PEACE 
The 3 December 2002 agreement between the 
government and the CNDD-FDD was Burundi’s first 
real step toward peace since the Arusha Agreement 
for Peace and Reconciliation two years earlier and 
established a framework and plan for transition from 
war to peace. The transitional government, 
established on 1 November 2001, had been very 
slow to implement Arusha, waiting instead for a 
ceasefire and international assistance. The recent 
agreement, therefore, has opened a critical window 
of opportunity. The ball is now in the international 
community’s court to give the financial and political 
support necessary to move the peace process forward.  
1. On the edge of peace or peace on the edge? 
Peace has remained elusive because the Arusha 
accord did not include the rebel groups. Signature of 
ceasefire agreements with three of the four rebel 
factions marks very important movement, therefore. 
The agreement between Buyoya and Nkurunziza 
established that a truce would be effective within 72 
hours of the signature, and within 30 days all rebel 
troops would be moved to barracks, facilitated by 
security corridors. Thirty days were given to negotiate 
all issues leading to the integration of the CNDD-
FDD into the governance, security and development 
aspects of Arusha, and provision was made for an 
African Observer Mission to verify and help 
maintain the ceasefire. The agreement was endorsed 
by the heads of state of the neighbouring countries. 
The truce has generally been respected, although 
some fighting surrounded the first food distributions 
to rebels who were still carrying arms and were 
 
 
4 Boyce, op. cit., p. 7. 
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suspected by the army of using the distribution as 
cover for infiltrating new territory. On 24 and 27 
January 2003 meetings between President Buyoya 
and the rebel groups in Pretoria created the Joint 
Ceasefire Commission and agreed on deployment of 
an African mission. Key issues relating to 
cantonment and the integration of the former rebels 
into the army, and their inclusion in the transitional 
government have yet to be addressed. In addition, 
the oldest rebel group, the FNL headed by Agathon 
Rwasa, remains outside the peace process and is still 
fighting.  
The ceasefire agreements are a very positive 
development in what has been a dragging peace 
process. The transitional government has allocated 
political posts and established legislative institutions 
but there have been few signs that a genuine transition 
from war to peace is beginning.5 The government has 
blamed the slow start on the absence of a ceasefire 
and the delayed delivery of promised international aid.  
Domitien Ndayizeye, the vice-president of the Front 
for Democracy in Burundi FRODEBU, is scheduled 
to take over the presidency from Pierre Buyoya on 1 
May 2003. Some members of the army already argue 
that this must be delayed until the Arusha agreement 
and the ceasefire agreement are both fully 
implemented since, they say, a FRODEBU President 
would not be trusted to oversee the reform of the 
security services.6 Similarly UPRONA, the former 
ruling party that supports President Buyoya, has also 
launched an international campaign to question the 
changeover. It claims that an unwritten condition 
was completion of the ceasefire implementation and 
that it would be unacceptable for the bulk of the 
reforms, including army reform, to be made the 
responsibility of a FRODEBU presidency.7  
Yet, there is no other option. Buyoya has to leave 
power on 1 May. True, this will leave the peace 
process in a risky situation. It would certainly have 
been better for the ceasefire and the Arusha reforms 
to be implemented fully under his presidency. 
However, there is still no compelling reason for the 
changeover to be delayed. First, even a delay would 
need a constitutional amendment, requiring a four-
 
 
5 For an early analysis of the transition, see ICG Africa Report 
N°46, Burundi: After Six months of Transition: Continuing the 
War or Winning the Peace?, 24 May 2002. 
6 ICG interviews, officers of the Burundian army, Bujumbura 
January 2003. 
7 ICG interview, UPRONA President, Bujumbura, January 
2003. 
fifths majority in the National Assembly and the 
Senate. This would be impossible without FRODEBU 
support. Even if FRODEBU gave in – more than 
highly unlikely – rival Tutsi parties to Buyoya’s 
UPRONA would not. An unconstitutional delay in 
handover would be equivalent to a third coup by the 
president8 and collapse the peace process. Pierre 
Buyoya himself is unlikely to support such a 
scenario in view of the regional and international 
condemnation that it would generate.  
Secondly, all countries of the region involved in the 
process except possibly Rwanda would be likely to 
strongly oppose a delay. Uganda, Tanzania and 
South Africa want to see Burundian leaders respect 
their words and make a success out of the Arusha 
agreement. Thirdly, one aim of the peace process is 
to build institutions and fight the personalisation of 
politics. Buyoya himself represents no guarantee for 
reform of the security services. His personal authority 
over the army and hardline opponents of reforms is 
likely to whither as the date of the changeover 
approaches. Deployment of the African Mission as 
well as a strong Joint Ceasefire Commission are 
better guarantees to implementation than the 
personal authority of any individual. Finally, the best 
way to stop the war is to address its root causes. 
The international community should speak with one 
voice and strongly support the changeover in order to 
lessen the risks to the best chance Burundi has had 
for peace since the war started. Momentum must be 
created to push forward the ceasefire negotiations and 
to implement the Arusha as much as possible by 1 
May. The engagement of the international community 
must include provision of financial aid, but it must 
not be limited to this. It must keep implementation 
on track and ensure that the changeover takes place 
as scheduled. 
Even the rebel movements are requesting sustained 
international engagement. "We request Burundians 
and the international community to support the 
process and accompany it until a mechanism leading 
to peace, democracy and integral development is 
established", stated the CNDD-FDD Secretary 
General at a press conference on 5 December 2002.9  
 
 
8 Pierre Buyoya took over power in military coups in 1987 
and 1996. 
9 Agence France-Presse, 5 December 2002. 
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2. The return of former fighters and refugees 
to a desperate situation 
The signature of the ceasefire agreement is only the 
beginning of a process. The end to the war requires 
the reintegration of an estimated 70,000 former 
combatants and 1.2 million Burundians who have 
taken refuge in other countries or in Burundi itself. 
The program for reforming the army outlined in the 
Arusha Accord requires the disarmament, 
demobilisation, reintegration, resettlement or 
repatriation (DDRRR) of rebels and soldiers alike. 
The World Bank estimates that the disarmament and 
reintegration of combatants will cost $90 million 
over four years, most of which is needed in the first 
year and a half.10 In addition, immediate measures 
are also essential to create jobs and build 
infrastructure. The Secretary General of the CNDD-
FDD expressed his concern for the demobilisation of 
what he said were 85,000 soldiers, militia and armed 
rebels: "These people must be helped, otherwise 
Burundi will emerge from civil war into a nation 
with a very high level of crime and insecurity".11 The 
money is not yet available, and the programs have 
not been adequately prepared. 
In addition to the former combatants, communities 
will have to take in approximately 1.2 million citizens 
who have been displaced from their homes. Over 
693,000 have fled to neighbouring countries, 388,000 
live in camps inside Burundi, and some 200,000 
have taken refuge in other villages or homes.12 Even 
during the heavier fighting in 2002, almost 53,000 
refugees returned to Burundi to resettle. Although 
the transitional government and UNHCR have 
established systems to reintegrate those who have 
already returned, these are not robust enough to 
accommodate all refugees, or monitor their 
reintegration. In addition, there are no significant 
government structures to reintegrate or support the 
almost 600,000 who are internally displaced.  
While the returning combatants, refugees and IDPs 
need special assistance to help them reintegrate into 
society, their survival fundamentally depends on the 
social and economic development of their 
 
 
10 Country Department 9, Environmental, Rural and Social 
Development Department, Africa Region, “Greater Great 
Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and 
Reintegration”, The World Bank (Washington, D.C., 25 
March 2002), p. 54. 
11 Agence France-Presse, 5 December 2002. 
12 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi 
(S/2002/1259). 
communities and the state itself. Economic and social 
infrastructure has dramatically eroded, with the 
destruction of an estimated 391 primary schools (28 
percent), 32 secondary schools, and 88 health centres 
(42 percent) since 1993.13 The direct impact on 
welfare has been disastrous. Burundi ranks only above 
Sierra Leone and Niger in the 2002 United Nations 
human development index, for example, while 233 
out of 1,000 children die before the age of five. The 
public infrastructure that does exist or has been 
reconstructed is concentrated in eight provinces where 
45 per cent of the population lives, leaving those that 
have suffered the most violence, destruction, and 
displacement with the fewest resources.  
Between 1993 and 2001 the country’s real GDP fell 
by 20 perccent. The world price of coffee, 
traditionally 90 per cent of Burundi’s export 
revenues, fell from U.S.$3,460 in the 1980s to 
U.S.$1,370 in 2001.14 Burundi’s annual production 
of the commodity fell to 18,000 tons in 2000 from 
36,800 a year between 1992 and 1996.15 Foreign 
exchange decreased dramatically from U.S.$300 
million in 1993 to U.S.$48 million in 1999 – only 
enough to cover one month of imports in 2002. 
Over 30 per cent of the state’s resources went to 
defence in 2001.16  
In 2002, an increased war effort, steadily decreasing 
foreign exchange reserves, external debt servicing 
that equaled 99 per cent of state export revenues, a 
20 per cent fall in coffee production, and high 
inflation compounded by a 20 per cent devaluation 
of the Burundian Franc left the economy in a 
desperate situation and the state unable to pay public 
servants.17 In mid-2002, a nation-wide strike of 
primary and secondary school teachers was followed 
 
 
13 Ministry of Planning, Development and Reconstruction, 
“National Reconstruction Program by the Burundian 
Government”, October 2002.  
14 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in 
Burundi (S/2002/1259). 
15 International Development Association, “Program Document 
for a Proposed Economic Rehabilitation Credit in the Amount 
of SDR 40.8 Million to the Republic of Burundi”, The World 
Bank (Washington, D.C., August 2002), p. 6.  
16 Statement by the IMF Staff Representative, Donor 
Conference on Burundi, Geneva, 27-28 November 2002.  
17 See report by the Government of the Republic of Burundi, 
“Recent Economic Situation and Reforms for Stabilization 
and Economic Recovery”, presented at the Roundtable 
Conference, Geneva, 27-28 November 2002. The cost of 
external debt financing was 99.4 per cent of goods and non-
factor services (GNFS) exports in 2002. 
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by riots by out-of-school students, and strike threats 
from other public service sectors.  
The people have also suffered extreme physical and 
psychological trauma from both sides in the conflict. 
In the second half of 2002, there was a marked 
increase in civilian massacres committed by the 
army, with more than 173 killed in just one incident 
in Itaba commune on 9 September. At the same 
time, rebels have killed dozens of civilians through 
“attacks, ambushes, and assassinations of local 
officials”, while looting homes, destroying crops and 
public infrastructure, firing mortar shells into major 
cities, and forcibly recruiting children.18 The UN 
Secretary General warned in his 2002 report on 
Burundi: “These abuses have the capacity to 
undermine the entire peace process and to ignite 
more vicious, ethnic based violence.”19  
3. The risks of international disengagement 
What if Burundi’s fragile peace process succumbs to 
the chaos and doubt surrounding it? What if donors 
decide that they will not support a peace that 
“Burundians themselves don’t seem to want,” as one 
member of the donor community said.20 It is true that 
some Burundians do not want peace, since they 
benefit from the status quo, including the war. Yet, 
the fact that there is dissent to the peace process is 
not a viable excuse for disengagement. After a 
negotiated ending to a civil war, domestic opinion 
often is divided between supporters and hardliners 
who would prefer a return to armed conflict.”21 
It does not take much imagination to see that failure 
of the peace process could be catastrophic. 
Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 
international attention focused on preventing the 
same disaster in Burundi – a hypothesis to which 
George W. Bush reportedly responded, “Not on my 
watch”.22 Much more likely, however, would be a 
scenario in which the war continued to erode the 
already weakened state and escalated to a full-blown 
conflict with repercussions for the entire Great Lakes 
Region, including even greater suffering in Burundi. 
 
 
18 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, “Burundi: Escalating 
Violence Demands Attention”, November 2002. 
19 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi 
(S/2002/1259). 
20 ICG interviews, U.S. State Department, Washington, 
December 2002. 
21 Boyce, op. cit., p. 32. 
22 ICG interviews, U.S. State Department, Washington, 
December 2002. 
"Personally, I would venture that Burundi today is 
the most preoccupying country in the Great Lakes 
region in terms of insecurity", World Bank spokesman 
Raymond Toye told reporters when he announced a 
U.S.$54 million economic rehabilitation loan. 
"Therefore it is of the greatest concern to all parties 
to get the region back to civilian business and 
peaceful economic development".23 A failure would 
certainly affect the peace process in the neighbouring 
Congo, for example by destroying the prospect of 
sustainable DDRRR and local reconciliation programs 
for armed groups (Congolese, Rwandan and 
Burundian alike) operating on DRC territory. 
B. WHY IS ‘RESPONSIBLE’ AID NECESSARY? 
Since the early 1970s, a small Tutsi elite has 
controlled economic, political, and military power in 
Burundi. Until the late 1980s, the international 
community turned a blind eye to the violent and 
discriminatory tactics it used to govern. But donors 
began to change their strategies toward the end of 
the Cold War, testing out sanctions and incentives. 
Following a spate of ethnic killings in 1988, continued 
non-humanitarian assistance was made contingent 
upon political and economic reforms. Although 
these reforms led to democratic elections in 1993, 
rushed and superficial implementation elicited a 
backlash from those interested in maintaining the 
status quo. Massive ethnic violence and chaos ensued 
after army officers assassinated the elected Hutu 
President Melchior Ndadaye on 21 October 1993.  
In 1996, after the second coup staged by Pierre 
Buyoya, Burundi’s neighbours instituted economic 
sanctions aimed at pushing the country toward 
peace. International aid was reduced by two-thirds, 
from an average of U.S.$247 million between 1981 
and 1995 to U.S.$76 million between 1996 and 
2000. The resumption of international cooperation at 
earlier levels was promised as an incentive for peace.  
Bilateral and multilateral donors, the United Nations, 
and international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) are powerful actors in Burundi. They have 
had both a positive and negative impact and in some 
instances become enmeshed in the conflict. They 
must not repeat their mistakes. They must do away 
with the “on again, off again” approach employed 
 
 
23 IRIN Great Lakes News, “Burundi: World Bank loan for 
economic rehabilitation”, 4 September 2002. 
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during the past 30 years in Burundi.24 A significant 
increase in development and reconstruction aid must 
not support consolidation of a violent discriminatory 
state or superficial reforms.  
1. The violent discriminatory state 
International aid failed to significantly challenge one 
of the primary tools of state discrimination in 
Burundi – the monopolisation of access to aid and its 
dividends by urban Tutsis in general and the ruling 
elite in particular. For most of the past 30 years, 
Burundi has been governed by a small group of Tutsi 
elite from a single commune (Rutovu), a single 
region (Bururi), and a single clan (Hima – Tutsi).25 
The mechanisms for maintaining power were the 
control of state subsidies, the coffee market and 
other key imports and the military. During the 1980s 
President Bagaza put in place education policies to 
ensure his supporters access to education, which 
opened the door to high-level military and political 
positions, and blatant discrimination against the 
Hutu masses. These policies were blindly supported 
by international aid. Military-financial networks 
were established to ensure that those in power 
maintained their hold on the state’s resources. No 
business or bank could be created unless it was 
sponsored by Mwaro Province (money), Bururi 
(political power) and Ijenda (technocrats).  
Violence was used by the state to maintain control, 
and by both Hutus and Tutsis fighting against the 
state. Hundreds of thousands, mainly Hutus, died in 
the massacres of 1965, 1969, 1972 and 1988. Tens 
of thousands of Tutsis paid with their lives for the 
assassination of the Hutu president Ndadaye in 1993. 
Over 250,000 people have been killed in the civil war.  
Until the late 1980s, the grants and loans that 
accounted for over 80 per cent of total investment 
were disbursed with few conditions.26 As the Cold 
 
 
24 Boyce, op. cit., p. 9, states that “[T]he pledges of aid after a 
peace accord are conditional from their very inception: the 
signing of the accord itself is a precondition for the aid. The 
subsequent disbursement of aid is also inherently conditional, 
insofar as a resumption of progress toward peace would 
jeopardize new aid commitments. The aim of peace 
conditionality is to move beyond these limited choices, in 
which the aid tap is either ‘on’ or ‘off’, and to link the flow of 
aid more closely to movement towards a lasting peace”.  
25 See ICG Central Africa Report, N°13, The Mandela Effect: 
Prospects for Peace in Burundi, 18 April 2000. 
26 See ICG Burundi Report, N°4, Burundi: Proposals for the 
Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation, 4 
May 1999. 
War ended, donors began to use Burundi as a test 
case to see how international assistance could be 
applied as both a carrot and a stick to promote change. 
In 1988, ethnic killing broke out in Kirundo Province, 
leaving over 15,000 dead, the majority at the hands 
of Tutsi-dominated government forces. For the first 
time, the international community threatened to 
withdraw financial assistance if substantial political 
and military reforms were not implemented. A 
statement by the U.S. House of Representatives 
urged “the President and Secretary of State to conduct 
a comprehensive reassessment of the United States’ 
bilateral relationship with the Government of 
Burundi with a view toward the immediate 
suspension of US assistance (other than humanitarian 
aid) unless…” a series of reforms were carried out.27  
The donor community used its combined financial 
and political influence to push for political reforms 
that would include Hutus in government and hold the 
military more accountable. President Buyoya, who 
had come to power in a coup only one year earlier, 
proved a willing partner. He immediately announced 
a policy of “national unity” and began including 
Hutus in the government and administration. He 
even appointed a Hutu prime minister. Yet these 
were superficial reforms. He did not attempt the 
structural changes that would ensure their success.  
Scholars have observed that: 
International actors unanimously supported 
the rushed pseudo-democratisation of the 
country without attention to the security issues 
that majoritarian elections under universal 
suffrage would pose for a divided society like 
Burundi. They seemed to assume that holding 
democratic elections would produce democratic 
politics… The elections rapidly and officially 
weakened the established means for regulating 
 
 
27 Quoted in Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and 
Genocide (Cambridge, 1994) pp. 129-130. The conditions 
listed by the U.S. House of Representatives were: “(a) an 
impartial enquiry…has been initiated to determine the causes 
of the outbreaks of violence; (b) the Government of Burundi 
has taken steps to investigate and prosecute those military and 
administrative officials and private individuals responsible for 
the recent atrocities…(c) the Government of Burundi has made 
substantial progress in promoting the safe return to their homes 
of Burundi refugee populations…(d) the Government of 
Burundi continues to assure foreign journalists and 
international humanitarian relief organisations free access to the 
areas affected by recent violence”. Official Development 
Assistance from the United States Government increased from 
U.S.$ 4 million in 1988 to U.S.$ 22 million in 1990. 
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the ways by which Burundi politics, as well as 
economic and social opportunities, could be 
pursued.28  
On 21 October 1993, less than five months after he 
was democratically elected, Burundi’s first Hutu 
president was murdered. 
In addition to the push for democracy, donors 
attempted to open up Burundi’s closed economy. 
Within the framework of the World Bank’s 
Structural Adjustment Programs, financial support 
was made contingent upon reforms to strengthen the 
currency, privatise state enterprises, and diversify 
exports beyond tea and coffee.29 Resistance to 
change by the economic and military elite and the 
outbreak of violence in 1993 left these reforms 
incomplete. Prices and import policies were 
liberalised, but the structure of the economy did not 
change, and the pool of people who benefited from 
the state’s resources was not significantly deepened.  
In an attempt to remove political and economic 
power from the hands of the elite, Tanzania, Kenya, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire and Ethiopia imposed an 
embargo on Burundi in July 1996. Unfortunately, it 
did not achieve its intended objectives, but resulted 
instead in the further consolidation of the economy 
in the hands of the oligarchy. The three-year 
embargo (1996-1999) stimulated development of a 
strong illicit economy benefiting those with access to 
political power and military protection. The 
distinction between public and private resources was 
increasingly difficult to make. Corruption and 
embezzlement became the norm. The licit economy 
deteriorated badly, harming the poorest the most. 
More Hutus are in high-level government positions 
as a result of the various reforms but the status quo 
has not significantly changed. Hutus are still 
prohibited from occupying high-level posts in the 
military, and those that do have access to political or 
financial power have made few changes to the 
established system. However, with increased 
political power sharing, it has become clear that the 
Burundian conflict is primarily between those who 
have access to state power and all its benefits, and 
those who do not, a distinction not solely of ethnicity.  
 
 
28 Lund, Rubin and Hara, “Learning from Burundi’s Failed 
Democratic Transition, 1993-1996”, in Cases and Strategies 
for Preventive Action, Twentieth Century Fund/Council on 
Foreign Relations (New York, 1998), pp. 63, 80. 
29 Ibid., p. 61. 
2. Powerful international actors  
The international community has not exercised its 
full strength in the face of Burundi’s tragedy. Much 
bilateral and budgetary support has not been based 
on a solid assessment of its impact. The UN has lost 
much of its independence in the country and is 
unable to effectively protect the rights of the people. 
International NGOs have saved many lives but also 
weakened the capacity of communities and the state.  
Bilateral and budgetary support – out of touch with 
reality. Despite the steady increase in international 
aid until the early 1990s, per capita income remained 
static. The financial and technical assistance provided 
by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and such bilateral donors as France, Belgium, 
Germany, the U.S. and EU should have led to a 
higher growth rate and wider distribution of state 
revenue, but in real terms the population saw little 
benefit, and the oligarchy gained more power.  
World Bank and IMF policies, for the most part 
backed by other bilateral donors, emphasised macro-
economic growth. They were not accompanied by 
complementary efforts to increase the productivity of 
the population, or assess their effect on the livelihood 
of Burundi’s people. The state-managed coffee 
industry, heavily supported by all donors as the 
primary source of foreign exchange, was viewed by 
many peasants as a crop that they were forced to 
farm while receiving only 30 per cent of the profits 
from the state company OCIBU. Budgetary and 
project support allocated directly through the 
government was not backed by adequate mechanisms 
to assess the need for budgetary allocations, monitor 
implementation, or evaluate results.  
By dealing solely with the state, international aid 
reinforced state control over the economy and 
indirectly supported the unbalanced distribution of 
resources and discriminatory policies that 
consolidated power in the hands of the elite. To 
support the transition from war to peace, bilateral 
donors and the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) must challenge their traditional top-down 
development programming and free market doctrine 
and institute programs suited to Burundi. These must 
focus on redistributing aid benefits and consider the 
impact on political and social stability, not only the 
economy. Bilateral and multilateral donors must also 
take on the responsibility of overseeing 
implementation through targeted peace conditionality 
– “formal peace criteria or informal policy dialogue 
that make aid conditional on efforts by recipients to 
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implement peace accords and consolidate the 
peace”.30  
It is no longer appropriate to use aid as a blanket 
sanction or incentive. A more nuanced approach 
must be developed. Donors need to honour their 
commitments to Burundi, at the same time as they 
demand that the government honours its 
commitments in the peace accords. 
United Nations – Loss of independence. The UN 
agencies have continued to support Burundi 
throughout the war. They provided technical 
assistance and staff to help to keep the government 
functioning, often seeming to take on more 
responsibility for the functioning of the country than 
the government did. The UN and international 
NGOs also ensured that emergency assistance was 
delivered directly to the people and carried out 
limited advocacy for their protection. 
In order to function during the war, the UN also 
relinquished much of its independence, becoming 
dependent on the government for security and staff 
survival. The head offices of all international 
organisations are in Bujumbura, which the army 
heavily protects from the rebels who encircle the 
city. In response to the murder of staff members in 
1999, all UN field missions are now accompanied by 
army escorts, a sight that does not comfort a 
population that has greatly suffered at the hands of 
the military. The UN and international NGOs have 
employed a remarkable number of local staff 
(heavily Tutsi), with very close, often familial, links 
to the government. Within most agencies there are 
links to what can be likened to a Burundian mafia, 
the same group that has run the country for 30 years. 
Combined with broader confusion among staff and 
UN Member States as to whether the role of the 
UN is to protect the state or its people, these close 
alliances with the government and the dependence 
on the army have hindered the UN’s capacity to 
hold the government accountable for guarding its 
citizens’ rights. The UN agencies have also had 
very minimal contact with the rebel groups, even 
after the beginning of ceasefire talks, creating a 
clear impression of partiality in the conflict. In a 
context of increased international aid, the 
imbalances of the past threaten to twist UN efforts 
again into an agent of conflict.  
 
 
30 Boyce, op. cit., p. 71.  
To support Burundi’s transition from war to peace, 
UN agencies must decrease their reliance on the 
government for security and consult all belligerents 
to design their programs, strengthen their capacity to 
support and monitor the implementation of the peace 
accords, advocate openly and strongly for protection 
of the Burundian people, and link operational and 
political approaches together through the development 
of a common analysis and a common voice.  
International NGOs – Weakening the state and the 
community. International non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have represented the sole 
direct and constant point of contact between the 
international community and the Burundian 
population. During the past ten years of violence, 
while government energy has been focused on 
fighting a war, international NGOs have taken 
increasing responsibility for providing social services 
and have become the primary implementers of 
bilateral donor and UN programs.  
The majority of the 57 international NGOs operating 
in Burundi are humanitarian in mandate and 
approach, placing their emphasis on the delivery of 
immediate assistance to communities rather than 
building capacity of either the people or the 
government. Humanitarian assistance has 
undoubtedly been necessary but the absence of 
community development or capacity building has 
had the adverse effect of creating a population 
accustomed to handouts and steadily losing its ability 
to care for itself in deteriorating circumstances.  
Some humanitarian NGOs have begun to implement 
more sustainable programs but these are rarely 
accompanied by sufficient planning or capacity 
building. Although the strategy of using international 
NGOs to bypass the government and deliver 
assistance directly to the population has saved many 
lives, a chaotic situation now exists on the ground. A 
plethora of overlapping and uncoordinated 
interventions do not necessarily respond to real needs. 
As one international worker commented, “After ten 
years of this, we are beginning to do some harm”.31 
To support Burundi’s transition from war to peace, 
international NGOs must openly acknowledge when 
they have the capacity to implement programs and 
when they do not. Humanitarian NGOs should not 
be charged with implementing community capacity 
building and reconstruction programs simply 
 
 
31 ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002. 
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because there is no one else. In general, 
humanitarian intervention cannot make up for the 
absence of more sustainable programs, and an 
attempt to do this may lead to failure. International 
NGOs must give up some autonomy and begin to 
feed into the development and reconstruction 
programs that are being prepared by the government 
and UN agencies. In addition, a more unified NGO 
community would be able to defend itself against 
mounting attacks by the government, which believes 
that NGOs are taking away its money.  
III. FROM PEACE-MAKING TO 
PEACEBUILDING: THE KEY 
INTERNATIONAL ROLE  
We stressed that the long history of inter-communal 
conflict was due to a fierce competition over very 
scarce resources that were accessible mainly 
through control of state power… Our commitment to 
seeing this conference come about is due to our 
belief that the political progress needs to be 
accompanied and reinforced by social and economic 
progress. It must be made possible for the people of 
Burundi to materially distinguish between the 
destructiveness of conflict and the benefits of peace. 
Nelson Mandela32 
Each stage of Burundi’s recent history has been 
simultaneously pre-conflict, conflict, and post-
conflict; requiring actions oriented toward prevention 
of future conflict, peacemaking oriented toward the 
present conflict, and peacebuilding aimed at 
preventing the re-emergence of past conflict and 
ensuring the success of the peace processes 
underway.33 A multi-dimensional program is 
therefore necessary for successful transition from war 
to peace. A 1998 UN Appeal for constructive donor 
engagement in Burundi cited a meeting of the UN 
Economic and Social Council that: 
…recognised that the phases of relief, 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and development 
are generally not consecutive, but occur 
simultaneously. The Council recommended 
that a comprehensive approach be developed 
for countries in crisis, in which key aspects of 
recovery, peacebuilding, human rights, 
economic growth and sustainable development 
are included.34  
The negotiators of the Arusha Agreement understood 
this comprehensive approach. Based on a solid 
analysis of the conflict, summarised by Protocol I, 
Arusha outlines measures to address the past causes 
through social and economic reforms; end the current 
 
 
32 Nelson Mandela, Donors Conference on Burundi, Paris, 6-
7 December 2000. 
33 Barnett R. Rubin, Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of 
Preventive Action (New York, 2002) p. 133. 
34 Referring to a July 1998 meeting of the Economic and Social 
Council in “Choosing Hope: The Case for Constructive 
Engagement in Burundi”, United Nations Resident Coordinator 
System in Burundi, p. 19. 
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violence and chaos through a ceasefire and political 
and institutional reforms; and reconstruct the physical 
and social fabric of the country through reconciliation, 
reintegration of war-affected populations and 
reconstruction of infrastructure. Protocol IV on 
Reconstruction and Development combines these 
actions into a comprehensive framework to make the 
peace agreement’s “principles and fundamental ideas 
operational and concrete”.35 The former include 
equal distribution of the state’s resources and creation 
a government that can protect the rights of its people 
through decentralised governance and respect for 
human rights. Protocol IV outlines coordination and 
decision-making mechanisms to allow the necessary 
diplomatic, institutional reform, humanitarian, 
reconstruction, and development efforts to take place 
simultaneously, with the strong support of the 
international community.36  
Although the transitional government has used 
Protocol IV as a guideline for its recent programs, 
the international community has largely ignored it. 
At the Geneva Donors Conference in December 
2001, the Canadian representative appealed for its 
use as the basis for reconstruction and development 
– “Months were spent negotiating the principles 
found therein and it is important that we ensure that 
Protocol IV is implemented”.37  
The international community is charged with 
overseeing Arusha’s implementation under the UN-
led Implementation Monitoring Committee. Donors 
committed to rebuilding Burundi prior to signature 
of the agreement in 2000, and reconfirmed their 
commitment with a pledge of U.S.$1.1 billion during 
three subsequent conferences. By November 2002, 
however, Burundi reported that donors had released 
only 20 per cent of the promised resources. Donors 
in turn have expressed their disillusionment with the 
peace process and a transitional government that is 
reluctant to implement the agreement that put it in 
power.  
A. PROMISES OF AID  
The international community has been instrumental 
in pushing the peace process forward. It urged 
 
 
35 Austrian Delegation, Donors Conference on Burundi, 
Geneva, 2001.  
36 See Appendix B for a summary of the contents of Protocol 
IV. 
37 Declaration of the Canadian Delegation, Donors Conference 
on Burundi, Geneva, 6-7 December 2001. 
President Buyoya’s national unity policy following 
the outbreak of ethnic violence in 1988. After the 
assassination of President Ndadaye in 1993, it 
threatened to withdraw aid if the army officers 
responsible did not relinquish power. Under the 
leadership of the Secretary General’s Special 
Representative, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, it 
negotiated a power sharing agreement (the 
Convention of Government) in 1994 that failed as 
violence increased along with mounting Hutu and 
Tutsi extremism. The effort at dialogue nonetheless 
continued.38 
The peace process was officially turned over to the 
regional heads of state39 led by Tanzanian President, 
Julius Nyerere, at the Cairo Summit in 1995, though 
the international community continued to support the 
ensuing negotiation process financially and provide 
political pressure behind the scenes. When regional 
states imposed an embargo in 1996, the international 
community followed and responded to escalating 
violence by reducing aid from U.S.$242 million in 
1995 to $51 in 1997. As noted the embargo stifled 
the normal economy but created a strong illicit 
economy that strengthened already rich businessmen 
connected to the regime. 
When Nelson Mandela took over as facilitator of the 
peace process in January 1999, he emphasised the 
importance of unified regional and international 
support. Donors had to commit the resources 
necessary to rebuild the country once an agreement 
was reached since the conflict was essentially rooted 
in social and economic inequality and desperation. 
At the beginning of his negotiation, he reminded the 
Security Council, “the failure of those responsible to 
provide conditions of security and social development 
to the people of Burundi does not represent some 
errant occurrence on the periphery. This hits at the 
heart of our common human obligation”.40 At the 
February 2000 summit in Arusha, high-level leaders 
of the U.S., France, Belgium and the UK pledged to 
support economic and social reconstruction once 
 
 
38 See ICG Africa Report N°23, Burundi: les enjeux du débat. 
Partis politiques, liberté de la presse et prisonniers politiques, 
12 July 2000. 
39 Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Zambia, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, and 
South Africa. 
40 Speech by Nelson Mandela to the Security Council, 19 
January 2000. 
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there was a peace agreement.41  
Many of the parties, including the government, felt 
that they were forced to the negotiating table. The 
disintegrating economy and the promise of aid once 
a viable peace agreement was reached left them with 
no choice. They believed that their reward would 
come when promised almost U.S.$450 million at the 
Paris donors conference in December 2000, a few 
months after the Arusha Agreement. But the 
transitional government has been very disappointed in 
the slow delivery of the money. In the three 
roundtables held since the signature of the Arusha 
Agreement, the donors have pledged a total of 
U.S.$1.1 billion, but only one-fifth has actually been 
delivered, according to government figures.42 
The donor community liked the idea of peace and 
was willing to provide pressure to push the process 
forward but is now reluctant to fully support 
implementation of the peace agreement. “We wanted 
to believe it could be done but we can’t be forced to 
believe it anymore”, said one donor referring to 
peace in Burundi.43 This is mainly due to the 
continuation of fighting, the fact that the transition 
government has not been implementing the reforms 
in the agreement and evidence of corruption in the 
government of transition. The level of donor 
representation has steadily decreased with each 
roundtable. Donors do not seem fully willing or 
certain how to honour their commitments.  
Since the signature of the ceasefire agreement, there 
have been a multitude of appeals from the transitional 
government, the Security Council, and the regional 
countries, among others, for donors to release the 
promised funds, but the deadlock has yet to be broken.  
 
 
41 See ICG Central Africa Report, N°13, The Mandela Effect: 
Prospects for Peace in Burundi, 18 April 2000. 
42 Between the first two conferences in 2000 and 2001, 
U.S.$832 million was pledged, only 20 per cent of which, the 
government said, had been received at the time of the third 
donors conference in November 2002. At that conference, 
donors committed to a total of U.S.$905 million, the vast 
majority of which was money pledges at the previous two 
conferences but not yet released.  
43 ICG interviews, Nairobi, November 2002. 
B. THE DEADLOCK BETWEEN THE DONOR 
COMMUNITY AND THE TRANSITIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 
Obvious tension has resulted between a donor 
community that seems to be waiting for progress in 
order to support peace, and a government that is 
waiting for money in order to make progress: 
The government is angry that the international 
community has not yet released the promised 
funds. Mandela pushed them to sign the 
Arusha Agreement with the understanding and 
the promise that they would receive the 
money. Now they are angry because the funds 
haven’t come through and the economy is 
falling apart, and they do not know how to 
hold together the transitional government or 
the state without this money.44  
1. Can unclear promises be broken? 
The first Donor Roundtable was held in Paris in 
December 2000, the second in Geneva in 2001. At 
both the transitional government presented plans it 
hoped donors would fund: a Priority Program for the 
Transitional Period (2001-2003) for U.S.$ 1,454 
billion, the National Action Plan for the Fight against 
HIV/AIDS (2002-2006) for U.S.$233 million, and 
the plan for national debt relief (2001-2005) for 
U.S.$307.7 million. This added up to a total request 
of almost U.S.$2 billion, significantly more than the 
U.S.$ 832 million donors promised. At the third 
conference, in Geneva, 27-28 November 2002, the 
government produced an emergency social program 
for U.S.$982 million, U.S.$100 million over the 
amount already promised, in hopes that donors would 
at least release what they had already pledged.  
The U.S.$832 million pledged at the first two 
conferences included only a few contributions in line 
with government programs. The majority were for 
humanitarian assistance already earmarked for 
Burundi, unfrozen development aid or other projects 
not included in the government’s plans, such as 
DDRRR and support for the South African 
Protection Force. The government had also hoped 
that the increased assistance would be allocated 
directly to budgetary assistance, as it had been before 
the war. Although some direct budgetary assistance 
was promised, most pledges were to go through 
international NGOs or UN agencies.  
 
 
44 ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002. 
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At the donor conference in November 2002, the 
government asserted that only 20 percent of the 
pledges promised had actually been received but no 
one is certain of the accuracy of the amounts either 
pledged or received. The absence of a uniform budget 
and proper accounting mechanisms has meant that 
the government has no way of assuring that all 
humanitarian assistance provided by donors directly 
to NGOs is actually included in its calculations. 
Donor pledges gave little indication of their time 
frame for disbursement or specific programs that 
would be supported.  
2. Why the delay? 
“The fact that this conference is taking place should 
also clearly signal to them that progress and 
development shall not wait for their (the rebels’) 
approval”, Nelson Mandela reminded the Paris 
donors conference.45 Although most donors agreed 
with this perspective, the reality of applying it has 
been a different story. One of the few bilateral 
donors prepared to renew full cooperation, and 
provide funds directly through the government, 
commented that it had to cancel two assessment 
missions in mid-2002 that were necessary for 
preparation of programs and release of funds 
because of increased fighting. “We want cooperation 
with Burundi to resume, but we do not want [our 
citizens] to get killed in the process”, a senior 
diplomat commented.46  
Initially, donors made the release of non-humanitarian 
funds contingent upon establishment of the 
transitional government and its participation in 
ceasefire negotiations. Once the transitional 
government was established on 1 November 2001, 
donors who had not already developed their programs 
began to do so, at which time it became more evident 
that the government was not prepared to absorb and 
transparently manage the new influx of funds. The 
reintegration, reconstruction and development plans 
outlined in Protocol IV did not exist.  
A donor commented: 
The government is looking for direct lump 
sum assistance, and does not want any 
conditionality. They seem to think that if they 
keep on asking for it, then the donors will come 
 
 
45 Nelson Mandela, at the Donors Conference on Burundi, 
Paris, 11-12 December 2000.. 
46 ICG interview, Nairobi, August 2002. 
around. They won’t come around. There is no 
other option than to have more accountability.47  
Although the EU had already released €12 million in 
budgetary assistance, most donors waited for the 
IMF to approve a post-conflict program and enforce 
accompanying monetary and fiscal reforms. They 
were particularly concerned about controlled 
exchange rate practices, speculation on coffee 
income and the increase of military expenditures. 
The IMF had been reluctant to develop such a 
program while fighting continued. Targeted lobbying 
by the Security Council, France, Belgium and 
Germany, and a choice by the U.S. and other donors 
not to block the program, led to a change in policy. 
On 9 October 2002 the IMF Board approved an 
emergency post-conflict assistance loan of U.S.$13 
million to support balance of payments, giving the 
green light for disbursement of budgetary assistance 
by other donors.  
In response to the ceasefire agreements, donors have 
shown increased readiness to support peacebuilding. 
One important example is the EU donation of 
€500,000 to distribute food aid to 14,000 CNDD-
FDD fighters over a one-month period. This was 
intended to support ceasefire implementation by 
guaranteeing that “that the arms of [a] few thousand 
hungry men do not lead to violence and retribution, 
which risk jeopardising the peace process”.48 The 
first food distribution took place on 29 December 
2002, allocated through the World Food Program 
and distributed by the German Technical Cooperation 
Agency (GTZ). It shows unprecedented engagement 
between donors and rebel groups, using aid as 
incentive for peace. 
3. Seeking dividends for faking change 
In the year since the transitional government was 
inaugurated, the political elite has been enlarged to 
include a representative number of Hutus and 
Tutsis, who are competing for the state’s resources. 
The government has concentrated on jockeying for 
posts, trying to get donors to resume cooperation, 
and fighting to win a war, not developing or 
implementing a transitional program. A senior 
official in the ministry of planning said: 
 
 
47 ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002. 
48 Comment by Poul Nielson, European Commissioner for 
Development and Humanitarian Assistance, Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Burundi, Burundi 
Humanitarian Update, December 2002, p. 2. 
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Burundian political parties have no 
programs. This is the problem. People are 
more concerned about good jobs rather than 
building the nation. Political parties are a 
means for the achievement of individual 
political ambitions, not for the reconstruction 
of the country.49 
Government officials launch unified calls for 
resumption of international cooperation but compete 
over who will control the money. A delegation of 40 
was sent to Washington in July/August 2002 to 
negotiate the post-conflict program with the IMF. 
The Hutu vice president, who oversees the poverty 
reduction process, was denied his request to attend, 
eliciting the comment from observers that 
reconstruction was about building a company called 
Buyoya Ltd., not about constructing a state.50  
The new Hutu members of government are waiting 
to access state resources while the Tutsi oligarchy 
tries to maintain control. Both groups have a 
common interest in resisting reforms that would 
increase accountability or distribute more resources 
directly to the people. For those in the government 
who want to implement reforms, there is a sense of 
disempowerment. A senior official complained that 
the government was doing nothing on Arusha. The 
response of one donor was, “You are the 
government, why aren’t you doing anything”?51  
Burundian public servants have historically been 
accorded great prestige and respect, if only because 
of their capacity to employ people and control 
resources that the vast majority of the population 
never dreams of accessing. Nonetheless, civil service 
does not bring with it the obligation to serve the 
public. This perspective has been increased by the 
short duration – eighteen months – of appointments 
in the transitional government. Most officials are 
primarily concerned with bringing the dividends of 
peace to themselves, not their people. The recent 
strike of primary and secondary school teachers was 
one of the first direct demands placed on the 
government by a major constituency for delivery of 
promised benefits. Yet, a prominent Hutu leader 
expressed frustration that the union had waited until 
Hutus were in government to demand overdue 
 
 
49 Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), “Burundi: 
Focus on Women in Government”, 11 September 2002. 
50 ICG interviews, Bujumbura, July/August 2002.  
51 ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002. 
salaries, assuming that Hutus would be more able 
and willing to provide the money.52  
More recently, concerns have been raised within the 
Implementation and Monitoring Committee for the 
Arusha Agreement over the content of the law 
instituting the National Commission on Refugees 
and Sinistrés (internally displaced persons).53 The 
law voted in parliament put the commission (known 
as the CNRS) under the supervision of the Ministry 
for Reconstruction instead of guaranteeing its 
independence as earmarked in the Arusha 
Agreement, and the exact terms of this supervision 
as well as the structural organisation and 
composition of the commission are unclear. The 
CNRS will preside over allocation of massive 
financial resources in the process of refugee 
repatriation and reintegration. It is essential that 
strong and transparent governance mechanisms are 
entrenched within it if it is to be trusted both by 
refugees and donors. The necessary clarifications 
have to be made urgently by the government.  
4. The incapacity of absorption – Nowhere 
for the money to go? 
The capacity of the government to manage resources 
and implement effective programs has greatly 
decreased as a result of the long war, the three years 
of embargo, the absence of training or capacity 
building of government employees, and the 
withdrawal of international cooperation. 
As confirmed recently by the Ministry of Good 
Governance, “Embezzlement and corruption are 
prevalent”.54 During the embargo, the exceptional 
practice of allocating the state budget to a separate 
account needing only a ministerial signature for 
release became the norm. Businessmen regularly 
underreported receipts and bribed state accountants. 
Exchange rate policies were controlled and geared to 
provide more resources for the well-connected. 
Intimidation of national and international staff who 
tried to expose corruption caused many to flee the 
country. 
The government lacks the information and analysis 
necessary for accurate planning, along with the staff 
capacity to actually monitor programs or assess 
 
 
52 ICG interview, Bujumbura, July 2002. 
53 ICG interviews, members of the IMC, Bujumbura, January 
2002. 
54 Radio et Télévision Nationale de Burundi (RTNB), 12 
November 2002. 
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situations on the ground. In addition, once information 
is available and plans are developed, there is 
uncertainty as to who can effectively implement the 
programs. Although UN agencies and NGOs have 
taken over much of the government’s responsibility, 
they do not have the human resources, operational 
capacity, or mandate to reconstruct the state.  
The implementation of Protocol IV requires that the 
international community increase its human and 
financial resources so that it can build the capacity of 
the state and people to restore Burundi. The IMF and 
World Bank have already supported the initiation of 
fiscal and monetary reforms, including a fiscal 
regulatory system and training of public accountants. 
Other donors are supporting the training of 
administrators and other public servants, as well as 
reconstruction of the health and educations systems. 
Although these initial efforts are important in 
showing what can be done, they are not nearly 
enough in the face of enormous needs.  
5. How to get to the village? 
Over the past three years, donors and the 
government have begun to support reconstruction 
through a series of community development 
projects.55 All these efforts offer a substantial basis 
for the reconstruction of Burundi and contradict the 
argument that it cannot be done while fighting 
continues. Nonetheless, there is little coordination of 
planning or implementation. Each organisation 
pursues different mechanisms for decentralisation 
and requests different degrees of community 
participation. The counterpart for many initiatives 
seems to be the Ministry of Reconstruction, rather 
than the Ministry of Community Development or the 
minister charged with planning development and 
reconstruction. The Ministry of Communal 
 
 
55 The World Bank supports the Emergency Reconstruction 
Project and Twitzembere, a reconstruction project based on 
community participation, and AGETIP, public works with 
high intensity manual labor; the European Union has 
developed the Reconstruction Program for Burundi, and 
UNDP has developed the Program for Community Support 
(Programme Cadre d’Appui aux Communautés), which is 
supported by many bilateral donors who cannot give money 
directly to the government (Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Canada, Japan, Germany, Sweden and Finland, among 
others). In addition, emergency reconstruction and 
agricultural development are sponsored by the European 
Union’s ECHO, USAID/OFDA, UNHCR, UNICEF, FIDA 
(Fonds international de dévelopment agricole) and FENU 
(Fonds d’équipment des Nations Unies) and implemented by 
international and national NGOs. 
Development was not even aware of the Communal 
Development Committees that the World Bank and 
UNDP projects are centred around.56  
The central government has shown little interest in 
strengthening decentralised structures. A few 
ministries have attempted to create community-
based committees that provide services and 
monitor the situation, but these have received little 
support or guidance from either the government or 
the international community.57 Ministry staff 
responsible for delivering social services lack the 
time, will, or resources to do monitoring at the 
community level.  
The capacity of government administrators has been 
weakened by corruption, the absence of investment 
in training and the cooption of governmental 
responsibilities by international agencies and NGOs. 
Government officials openly admit to the 
discouragement of staff, a high number of whom 
have been recruited by international NGOs and UN 
agencies. “There is not the minimum level of 
functioning necessary to take on the enormous 
workload”, said one ministerial staffer. Average 
salaries for high-level staff – not raised in years – 
reach only U.S.$ 80 a month. 
Few structures in Burundian society demand 
government accountability. All administrators are 
appointed by the central government. Taxes collected 
at the commune level are centralised in Bujumbura, 
leaving no mechanisms to hold officials accountable 
for the delivery of services to their constituency. 
Civil society is weak, and communities are fractured 
and disorganised, unable to unite or express their 
demands to the government by peaceful means.  
Additionally, the communities are left with little will 
to provide for themselves, much less place demands 
on their government. A former official said that the 
years of NGO handouts have weakened the will to 
work. “In order to have development, you have to 
have hope”, he said. “Not suffering from your 
circumstances, but knowing that you can take an 
action to change them”. One NGO reoriented its 
program to create a community development plan 
 
 
56 ICG interview, Bujumbura, August 2002. 
57 The Ministry of Social Action and the Promotion of 
Women has developed Centres for Family Regroupment in 
eleven provinces; the Minister of Human Rights has 
developed Provincial Protection Committees in seventeen 
provinces, and the Ministry of Planning has established 
Provincial Planning Centres. 
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because it realised there was no way to develop a 
micro-credit program with the level of disintegration 
prevailing at the community level: 
Everyone was so used to working in the 
hierarchical, top down system that they 
didn’t see how it could work another way. 
This process has proven that communities 
can develop themselves and their own 
development plans, which many people 
thought couldn’t happen. They thought that 
the community was too stupid and didn’t 
know what it needed.58 
C. BREAKING THE DEADLOCK FOR PEACE 
The international community should not send mixed 
signals to Burundi that would allow for manipulation 
of their potential contradictions. Rather, it should 
speak consistently and with one voice with respect to 
the positions it takes and the actions it implements.59 
1. No unity, no vision, no plan  
The Arusha peace negotiations succeeded in unifying 
the international community behind the facilitator, 
Nelson Mandela. He encouraged leaders of regional 
states and major Western powers to voice their 
support for peace openly and jointly, acknowledging 
their obligation toward Burundi and without being 
divided by the various political sides.60 When 
Mandela handed the peace process over to the UN 
and the transitional government on 1 November 
2001, this unifying force was lost.  
In the transition from peace-making to peacebuilding, 
the international community has lost its way, and 
found itself without a vision or a coherent framework. 
Donors and UN agencies have not been able to 
transfer the solidarity found at Arusha to the 
implementation phase inside Burundi. Although most 
donors agree on overall objectives – reconciliation, 
democracy and prosperity – each uses different 
strategies and means. The power of the donor 
community in general and each donor specifically 
 
 
58 ICG interview, Bujumbura, July-August 2002. 
59 Recommendation F-1: Immediate and Urgent measures for 
Burundi, Chapter 5 (Part II): Overall Findings and 
Recommendations in The International Response to Conflict 
and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, edited 
by Howard Adelman and Astrid Surke, Danida, March 1996. 
60 See ICG Report, Mandela Effect, op. cit., pp. 23-24 for 
more information. 
has greatly dissipated because of the different 
messages given in terms of who is supported 
politically, mechanisms for allocation of assistance61 
and conditionality for renewed bilateral cooperation. 
Each donor has developed its own strategic 
framework, often through bilateral discussions with 
the government but not based on a common analysis 
of the situation in Burundi or serious consultation 
with other donors or implementing partners.62 
Although these strategies are loosely based on the 
analysis behind the Arusha Agreement, each donor 
has chosen its solution to the conflict based on its 
own mandate and priorities. Some solutions are 
contradictory or repetitious. At a coordination 
meeting in August 2002, five donors realised that 
they were supporting the same program to strengthen 
the parliament.63 There is also the serious risk that 
the IMF and World Bank macro-economic programs 
will work against plans to build micro-capacity and 
productivity if there is not a careful balancing effort.  
This absence of international unity has contributed to 
the stagnation of the peace process. Individuals within 
the government who seek to implement the reforms 
outlined in the Arusha Agreement and know that 
they face great resistance from those in and outside 
government who do not want change have requested 
that the international community apply pressure.  
The transitional government has developed its own 
strategies and plans, all of which require the 
financial and operational support of donors, UN 
 
 
61 Donors are providing some budgetary assistance directly to 
the government, co-managing project specific assistance with 
the government in the areas of health and education, using 
UN agencies to implement community-based programs, using 
international NGOs to implement humanitarian and expanded 
humanitarian programs and supporting civil society 
organisations. If uncoordinated or not based on a coherent 
strategy, this number of actors creates a chaotic and often 
ineffective situation.  
62 Bilateral donors have developed their own transitional 
strategies, with the U.S. government developing three: one 
for emergencies (OFDA), one for transitional support (OTI) 
and one for development (USAID). The World Bank has 
given several emergency loans, and the IMF has an 
emergency post-conflict program. The European Union has 
created its transitional support strategy in line with the latest 
ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. Each UN agency has 
developed its strategic plan based on its mandate, is working 
on the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), 
and has completed the 2003 Consolidated Interagency 
Appeal for humanitarian assistance. 
63 ICG interviews, Bujumbura, August 2002. 
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agencies and NGOs.64 For presentation at the donor 
conference in Geneva on 27-28 November 2002, it 
prepared two important strategic plans identified in 
Protocol IV: the National Reconstruction Program 
and the Emergency Social Program for the Interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (IPRSP). These 
plans are much more conceptually integrated than 
those of the international community. But because 
their execution is dependent on outside help, their 
implementation risks being chaotic.  
The IPRSP is the closest document to an overall 
strategy developed with a degree of input from the 
population.65 It is also the only strategy developed 
that echoes many Protocol IV priorities; however, it 
does not openly address the factors that caused the 
conflict and shows no linkage between the strategy 
and the implementation capacity of each ministry. It 
also does not mention that many of its programs are 
already being implemented by the international 
community. It is another example of selective 
Arusha implementation and leaves out some 
fundamental mechanisms that would help transform 
the system that led to the conflict in the first place.66 
It is a basis for strategic coordination but does not 
replace the need for the donor community to develop 
a joint political and operational strategy to support 
the transition.  
The current debate among donors around how much 
they can and should engage in building peace 
ignores their essential role in determining whether 
peace is built. Delivery of the promised peace 
dividends would prove that donors are committed to 
the process. It would offer an important incentive for 
the CNDD-FDD to join the Arusha process fully and 
for the FNL to begin negotiations. It would also give 
donors the clout necessary to pressure the 
transitional government to make the reforms 
committed to at Arusha and enable them to establish 
peace conditionality mechanisms. Implementation of 
Protocol IV on reconstruction and development 
 
 
64 The transitional government has developed the transitional 
constitution, the transitional strategy, and strategies and 
action plans for each sectoral ministry.  
65 The first IPRSP was presented on 11-12 April 2002 in 
Bujumbura and elaborated upon seven months later in Geneva. 
Although there was some input from the population, a major 
donor criticism was that this was not inclusive enough, focusing 
on administrators rather than the population itself.  
66 If programs reinforce the hierarchical nature of Burundian 
society, with no participation or reconciliation at the 
community level, then they will be ineffective in addressing 
the root causes of the conflict and will not be appropriated by 
the Burundians themselves. 
would prepare the way for the return of former 
combatants, refugees and IDPs to their communities 
and help them to become constructive actors in a 
peaceful state. By creating more economic power 
that could be shared, it would also facilitate bringing 
new partners into power positions in the government, 
administration and military. Finally, it would show 
Burundians that peace can and will actually benefit 
them and so give them hope for the future. 
2. Ineffective coordination 
The absence of an overall international vision or 
framework for supporting the transition from war to 
peace has made it especially difficult to coordinate 
implementation of the numerous strategies that exist.  
Donor community coordination meetings are 
irregular, poorly attended and tend to focus more on 
information sharing than joint strategy development, 
planning or problem solving. Although UN agencies 
hold regular coordination meetings, they often 
concentrate on the debate between relief and 
development, specific challenges faced by each 
development sector or administrative issues rather 
than effective coordination of their various activities 
or approaches. There is a particularly large gap 
between the political and operational approaches, 
which led the Secretary General to call on the 
various parts of the UN system to “cooperate closely 
and coordinate their activities with the Chairman of 
the IMC”.67 The newly-established Inter-Agency 
Cell for Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction is supporting better planning and 
coordination among UN agencies, but there is still 
important work to be done in linking their activities 
with those of bilateral and multilateral donors and 
international NGOs.  
The greatest coordination effort has been geared 
toward the 57 international NGOs.68 Since 1996, 
they have been the main implementing partners of 
donors and UN agencies for delivering assistance 
directly to the population. The UN and international 
NGO coordination mechanisms play important roles 
in the existing void but are also based on information 
 
 
67 Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in 
Burundi, 2002. 
68 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) organises weekly coordination meetings in 
Bujumbura and monthly coordination meetings in the 
provinces. Each UN agency is responsible for monthly 
meetings for its sector, all of which bring together UN 
agencies, NGOs and donors. 
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sharing rather than strategy or joint planning. The 
Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, which is 
supposed to be the main tool for coordination of UN 
agencies and NGOs, remains a document rather than 
a comprehensive coordination process.  
The government has few effective coordination 
mechanisms. In line with Protocol IV, the Ministry 
of Planning has recently outlined creation of two 
coordination mechanisms: the Inter-Ministerial 
Monitoring Commission for Economic and Social 
Policy (CIPES), which will meet every two months, 
and a permanent support structure, the Inter-
Ministerial Cell for Reconstruction and 
Development (CIRD).69 Along with the CNRS, these 
units represent important steps toward increased 
coordination within the government. Nonetheless, at 
this point they wield little power or authority.  
Donors, UN agencies, international NGOs, and the 
government all agree that there are serious problems 
with joint planning and coordination, at the same 
time as they express their sense of helplessness to 
change the situation. Yet, ineffective coordination 
and joint planning have serious repercussions on the 
entire reconstruction process, wasting the sparse 
resources available.  
3. No leadership means no influence  
Peace conditionality – formal performance criteria 
or informal policy dialogue that makes aid 
conditional on efforts by recipients to implement 
peace accords and consolidate the peace – can 
strengthen the incentives for ending conflict and 
discourage a return to war. 
James K. Boyce70 
At the end of August 2002, the government 
produced a favourable assessment of Arusha 
 
 
69 The National Reconstruction Program recommends the 
mobilisation of necessary technical and financial resources, 
clarification of objectives and areas of operation of the large 
number of international and national participants in the 
reconstruction process, improvement of the planning process, 
better collection of data and circulation of information and 
reinforcement of decentralised structures. This document also 
clarifies that the Ministry of Repatriation should be the focal 
point for humanitarian interventions, each sectoral ministry 
(health, education, etc.) should be charged with projects in its 
particular area of expertise and the Ministry of Planning 
should be charged with planning, fundraising, monitoring and 
evaluation for the reconstruction plan. 
70 Boyce, op. cit., p. 11. 
implementation. Out of 58 measures that had been 
committed to, thirteen were said to have been 
achieved, 25 were “being implemented” and 
approximately twenty were not possible without a 
ceasefire. Because the international community is 
not closely monitoring implementation, it paid little 
attention to the fact that important measures were 
missing from the list or that some of those underway 
did not include essential principles of the agreement.  
In most other prominent peace processes, a donor 
coordination unit has been established to make 
policy and ensure that the process is moved forward. 
The Arusha Agreement gave the Implementation 
Monitoring Committee (IMC) the responsibility to 
“follow up, monitor, supervise, coordinate and 
ensure the effective implementation of all the 
provisions of the Agreement”.71 The IMC, however, 
is run by the United Nations Office in Burundi, and 
does not regularly communicate with the major 
donors, or even other UN agencies. Nelson Mandela 
knew that signature of the agreement and 
inauguration of the transitional institutions were only 
the beginning of the process and that the most 
difficult task would be implementing the peace in 
such a fractured society. He passed the responsibility 
on to the UN, the donor community and the 
transitional government but the ball has been dropped. 
The donor community must find its voice and 
establish mechanisms for closely monitoring the 
implementation of the Arusha Agreement as well as 
the recent ceasefire agreement, in coordination with 
other international actors. Donors have the money 
and so must lead. They need to use Arusha as a 
guideline for peace conditionality. This strategy 
would diverge from the traditional donor tactics of 
sanctions and incentives. It would be more nuanced 
and engaged, requiring donors to monitor closely all 
aspects of the peace agreement. They would need to 
apply pressure as a unified force and develop a 
targeted strategy of withholding or providing 
assistance based on compliance with the specific 
conditions outlined in the agreement.  
This will require dialogue with the transitional 
government, and regular strategy meetings among 
themselves. It will also require much stronger 
coordination mechanisms among the UN, NGOs, 
and sectoral ministries. James Boyce presents four 
 
 
71 Protocol V: Guarantees on Implementation of the 
Agreement, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for 
Burundi, August 2000. 
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strategies for following through on agreed “aid-for-
peace” bargains between donors and the transitional 
government: monitoring compliance, redistributing 
resources, combating corruption, and inter-donor 
coordination.72 Burundi now has the basic 
framework for implementing each of the Arusha 
strategies; now the donor community has to show 
the leadership to implement them.  
 
 
72 Boyce, op. cit., pp. 21-23. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive 
and integrated policy of peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention and resolution within the framework of 
the Partnership… In post-conflict situations, the 
Parties shall take all suitable action to facilitate the 
return to a non-violent, stable and self-sustainable 
situation. The Parties shall ensure the creation of the 
necessary links between emergency measures, 
rehabilitation and development cooperation.”73 
To have a positive effect on peace in Burundi, the 
international community must restructure and 
consolidate its approach, a process that must be led 
by donors. A donor coordination unit should be 
established in Bujumbura, and liaise with the 
transitional government and the Implementation 
Monitoring Committee to establish a joint strategy 
for implementing Protocol IV of the Arusha 
Agreement. In return for assistance, donors should 
demand reduction in military expenditures and 
cessation of speculation on coffee income and on 
monetary exchange. This new approach and joint 
strategy will help the international community speak 
with one voice and hold the government to its 
commitments as the donors hold themselves 
accountable to their own.  
In addition to humanitarian assistance for specific 
emergencies, the priority programs should include 
support for the development of plans and the 
provision of aid for the demobilisation and 
reintegration of former combatants, and the 
reintegration of refugees and internally displaced 
persons. There is also an urgent need to implement 
programs to reform the economy, develop 
community-level social and economic infrastructure, 
train civil servants, and implement comprehensive 
reconciliation and justice programs. More details on 
all these urgent measures are included in Protocol IV 
of the Arusha Agreement. Yet much of the 
effectiveness of these programs will be lost if the 
donor community, UN agencies, and NGOs do not 
construct an effective framework for their support, 
and commit to building peace.  
 
 
73 Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the members of 
the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States and 
the European Communities (European Union) and its 
member states, Article 11 on peacebuilding policies, conflict 
prevention and resolution. 
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The international community holds part of the 
solution to the Burundi conflict while its lack of 
engagement forms part of the problem. Even with a 
ceasefire, marginal violence will continue, as will 
resistance to change from the oligarchy. Political 
leadership from the international community is 
necessary to get over these barriers. The 1 May 2003 
changeover is the most important deadline of the 
whole peace process, and the international 
community should mobilise to ensure it goes 
smoothly, with minimal risk of destabilisation. 
Responsible aid would consolidate the credibility of 
the transitional government and become the engine 
for the reforms outlined in Protocol IV. It would 
address the structural causes of the conflict and build 
peace. If donor countries do not provide the full 
political and financial support necessary to 
implement Arusha, they can anticipate having to 
face the consequences of its collapse. 
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 February 2003 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUMMARY OF PROTOCOL IV 
 
 
Protocol IV is based on the following analysis and 
proposes the following measures: 
Through the Burundi Peace Negotiations at Arusha 
it has been possible to assess how seriously the 
political and ethnic crisis that has torn Burundi apart 
since independence has affected Burundian society. 
Hundreds of thousands of Burundians are refugees, 
some of them for more than 25 years. Hundreds of 
thousands more are forced to live in camps where 
conditions are appalling. There has been widespread 
destruction of public infrastructure, homes and rental 
property, commercial centres, etc… The Burundian 
economy has been badly damaged and is on the 
verge of bankruptcy. Burundi’s population has 
grown increasingly poor – the number of people 
living under the poverty threshold exceeds 60 per 
cent in both rural and urban areas. 
All Burundians are aware that a lasting peace is 
impossible so long as a definitive solution is not 
found to the problem of refugees and sinistrés.74 
Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the 
country’s wealth is not shared equitably. Burundi 
cannot help the sinistrés, rebuild destroyed property 
and restore its economy without the assistance of the 
international community. The international 
community is waiting for a visible political gesture 
that will reflect the commitment of Burundians to 
refrain from ever again destroying their own country 
and their willingness to build the country together 
and ensure that equity prevails in the sharing and 
distribution of the country’s resources.75 
1. Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Refugees 
and Sinistrés 
The National Commission for the Reintegration of 
Sinistrés, based on a priority plan and a good 
reintegration policy, is charged with: 
 
 
74 Sinistrés are defined as the over 1 million Burundians who 
are displaced, regrouped and dispersed and returnees. 
75 This text is taken directly from the General Conclusions of 
the Report of Committee IV of the Arusha Agreement, 
Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi, 
August 2000. Committee IV was charged with developing 
Protocol IV. 
! ensuring the equal distribution of resources 
for refugees and sinistrés; 
! addressing the issue of land through the 
creation of a sub-commission; 
! conducting a census of the refugee and 
sinistrés populations;  
! the adoption of policies to ensure that in the 
short, medium or long term there will no 
longer be anyone living within camps inside 
the country;  
! making sure that all returning people receive 
the necessary material support and have 
adequate access to social services;  
! promoting the participation of the population 
in resettlement activities; and 
! creating additional reception committees at 
the community level to ensure that the 
refugees and sinistrés receive the assistance 
needed and that their rights are protected.  
In preparation for the return, the government must 
organise information and awareness campaigns on 
mechanisms for peaceful co-existence and the 
return to collines (hills) of origin. 
Other vulnerable groups must be protected and 
receive assistance with rehabilitation and 
advancement, although a responsible ministry is 
not designated.76 
A National Fund for Sinistrés will derive its 
funding from the national budget, grants from 
bilateral or multilateral agencies and NGOs. 
 
 
76 Protocol IV lists the following vulnerable groups: children 
heads of family, orphans, street children, widows, women 
heads of family, unaccompanied minors, juvenile delinquents, 
the physically and mentally disabled as well as traumatized 
children. It requests that a census be conducted of these groups 
and that the relevant ministry draw up assistance programs. 
Relatively adequate statistics on most of these groups have 
already been pulled together by UNICEF and the Ministry of 
Social Action and the Promotion of Women. 
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2. Physical and Political Reconstruction 
The Inter-Ministerial Reconstruction and 
Development Unit is charged with developing an 
emergency reconstruction plan and a reconstruction 
plan for the transition period that includes the 
physical reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure 
(houses, health centres, schools, water infrastructure) 
and the development of community capacity to 
maintain the existing and newly constructed 
infrastructure.  
! These reconstruction plans also include 
political reconstruction with measures to 
establish the rule of law, reform the judiciary, 
promote the advancement of women, support 
the democratisation of institutions, support 
parliament and support the development of an 
independent and competent civil society and 
media and political parties.  
! To ensure that reconstruction and reconciliation 
take place simultaneously, the reconstruction 
plans include the development and 
dissemination of a national reconciliation 
program,77 the promotion of human rights and 
freedoms78 and the development of a nation-
wide program for education for a culture of 
peace.  
! The principles of equal distribution, 
community participation and ownership, 
transparency and accountability of fund 
utilisation and sustainability underlie all 
proposed reconstruction activities.  
The Inter-Ministerial Reconstruction and 
Development Unit will involve donors in the work 
of the unit, who may request an international 
auditing company to monitor all financial 
operations and accounts established. In addition, all 
plans developed by this unit are to be submitted to 
the National Assembly for approval.  
 
 
77 The national reconciliation program outlined in Protocol 
IV includes the promotion of mutual self-help and teamwork 
under the housing reconstruction program and other 
economic and social development programs, psychological 
care for traumatised children, peace and reconciliation 
committees and a historical study leading toward a common 
interpretation of history. 
78 The human rights and freedoms program will be targeted 
toward political leaders and government officials among 
others. 
3. Economic and Social Development 
Protocol IV outlines the basis for a comprehensive 
economic and social development program that is 
supposed to be elaborated in medium and long-term 
development plans prepared by the Inter-Ministerial 
Reconstruction and Development Unit. With the 
support of the international agencies, this program 
shall begin work on remedying the economic 
situation, reversing the trends resulting from the 
crisis, particularly the intensification of poverty, and 
taking up the challenges that impede economic 
development. This includes:  
! work towards macro-economic and financial 
stabilisation;  
! attempts to solve the problem of external and 
domestic public debt; 
! initiation of structural reforms in the social 
sectors;  
! creation of an environment conducive to the 
expansion of the private sector;  
! efforts to create new jobs and compliance with 
the criteria of equity and transparency in 
employment;  
! ensurance of good governance in the 
management of public affairs;  
! making operational the Court of Audit 
established under the provisions of Chapter I 
of Protocol II to the Agreement;  
! transformation of the communes into focal 
points for development and promotion of 
greater public access to state services by 
means of a decentralisation policy;  
! promotion of the role of women and youth in 
development, with the aid of specific 
measures to benefit them;  
! initiation of Burundi’s integration into the 
region; and 
! equitable apportionment of the benefits of 
development. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
THE MISSING PIECES OF THE COORDINATION AND STRATEGY FRAMEWORK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN and NGO Missing Pieces: 
! No transitional strategy – poor linkages between various strategies and plans 
! No joint planning – focus on sectors rather than big picture 
! No joint NGO strategy 
! No linkages with the Inter-Ministerial Unit 
! Poor linkages with donor reconstruction programs 
! Poor coordination between UN agencies and the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) 
Donor Missing Pieces: 
! No strategy 
! No effective coordination meetings 
! No coordination unit and secretariat  
! No unified approach toward government, UN or NGOs 
! Insufficient staff capacity 
Government Missing Pieces: 
! No National Commission for the Reintegration of Sinistrés (CNRS) 
! No complete transitional strategy 
! No effective coordination meetings or mechanisms 
! Weak Inter-Ministerial Unit 
! Insufficient information on population’s needs and programs being implemented 
! Unclear distinction between CNRS and Inter-Ministerial Unit 
! Insufficient staff capacity 
! Insufficient financial resources 
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APPENDIX D 
 
TABLE OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO BURUNDI 1960-200079 
 
 
Year Total Loans Total Grants Emergency Aid** Debt Forgiveness Grants** Total Net 
1960 0 44.35 N/A N/A 44.35 
1961 0 42.7 N/A N/A 42.7 
1962 0 61.65 N/A N/A 61.65 
1963 1.6 30.49 N/A N/A 32.09 
1964 11.02 28.78 N/A N/A 39.8 
1965 4.01 19.26 N/A N/A 23.27 
1966 2.56 38.85 N/A N/A 41.41 
1967 2.95 44.71 N/A N/A 47.66 
1968 1.86 61.37 N/A N/A 63.23 
1969 2.92 68.76 N/A N/A 71.68 
1970 2.77 78.54 N/A N/A 81.31 
1971 2.42 89.68 N/A N/A 92.1 
1972 2.11 94.45 N/A N/A 96.56 
1973 0.73 87.46 N/A N/A 88.19 
1974 5.43 106.05 N/A N/A 111.48 
1975 3.45 116.03 N/A N/A 119.48 
1976 3.15 106.56 N/A N/A 109.71 
1977 20.45 82.8 N/A N/A 103.25 
1978 43.72 94.4 N/A N/A 138.12 
1979 51.25 107.05 N/A N/A 158.3 
1980 55.14 123.47 N/A N/A 178.61 
1981 31.52 174.29 N/A N/A 205.81 
 
 
79 OECD Development Assistance Committee, International Development Statistics (IDS) Online Databases, 
(http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/). 
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1982 82.29 136.75 N/A N/A 219.04 
1983 91.13 157.29 N/A N/A 248.42 
1984 95.6 163.99 N/A N/A 259.59 
1985 92.7 163.02 N/A N/A 255.72 
1986 127.23 149.26 N/A N/A 276.49 
1987 139.32 102.27 N/A N/A 241.59 
1988 112.44 117.32 N/A N/A 229.76 
1989 95.49 145.65 N/A 2.39 241.14 
1990 72.27 192.41 N/A 10.24 264.68 
1991 70.85 179.91 N/A 6.46 250.76 
1992 78.64 204.5 N/A 7.04 283.14 
1993 47.85 156.42 N/A 7.38 204.27 
1994 19.61 265.81 N/A 7.9 285.42 
1995 13.61 228.83 19.82 8.64 242.44 
1996 9.08 82.8 28.72 9.59 91.88 
1997 -6.62 57.69 18.18 0.56 51.07 
1998 13.96 57.46 22.93 8.68 71.42 
1999 -5.98 76.89 32.84 6.87 70.91 
2000 18.18 74.48 28.31 5.63 92.66 
**Figures adjusted for inflation not available. Figures are in millions of U.S. dollars. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures 
have been adjusted to 2000 inflation levels. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
TABLE OF PLEDGES FROM PARIS AND GENEVA DONOR CONFERENCES 
 
 
Donors Nature of assistance Amount Pledged (U.S.$ million) 
  2000 2001 
Austria Reconstruction, water and sanitation, democracy and human rights, and 
debt write off 
4.0 13.26
Belgium Security and humanitarian assistance, social sectors, public works and 
economic management, HIV/AIDS 
24.0 25.42
Canada Peace and humanitarian assistance, DDR .. 2.0
Denmark Humanitarian assistance 8.35 ..
Finland Security and humanitarian assistance 2.36 1.5
France Justice and national reconciliation, reinsertion and reintegration, 
rehabilitation of infrastructure, food security, rural development, public 
expenditure management, training and technical assistance 
6.85 3.98
Germany Conflict prevention and democracy, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS 31.36 35.68
Italy Reinsertion, decentralisation, gender, orphans and HIV/AIDS  2.0 6.4
Japan Food security and HIV/AIDS 1.24 1.0
Netherlands Humanitarian, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration 5.0 ..
Norway Peace and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and DDR 6.0 4.3
OIF Governance, education through direct support and scholarship 1.5 ..
OPEP Fund Agriculture and rural development 10.0 15
Sweden Humanitarian assistance and social sectors 4.22 ..
Switzerland Humanitarian assistance and debt relief 5.29 ..
UK HIV/AIDS, debt relief 8 8
U.S. Humanitarian assistance, agriculture and rural development, social sectors 
and HIV/AIDS, support to refugees and orphans, promotion of civil society 
and gender, education and training 
70 150
EU Balance of payments support, food security humanitarian assistance, 
reinsertion and reintegration, rehabilitation of economic and social 
infrastructure, agriculture and rural development technical assistance 
133.35 242.17
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AfDB Agriculture and rural development, infrastructure, education, social action 
projects and poverty alleviation, rehabilitation of economic and social 
infrastructure, post-conflict reconstruction and governance 
27.7 78.53
IMF Emergency post-conflict assistance facility and technical assistance, 
macroeconomic management 
25.0 25.0
UNDP Donor coordination, food security, rehabilitation, reintegration, 
governance, HIV/AIDS, technical assistance 
20.0 32.0
UNICEF Rehabilitation of social infrastructure and education .. 31.0
FNUAP HIV/AIDS reintegration and reinsertion  .. 1.5
World Bank Balance of payments support, DDR, rehabilitation of economic and social 
infrastructure, public works and roads rehabilitation, education and health, 
HIV/AIDS and orphans, governance and public expenditure management, 
poverty monitoring, technical assistance, macroeconomic management. 
50.0 156.0
Total pledge 
Amount 
 446.24 832.74
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APPENDIX F 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 
Political Parties and Armed Movements* 
ABASA: African Burundi Alliance for Salvation, created in 1993, led by Térence Nsanze (external wing) 
and Serge Mukamarakiza (internal wing)  
ANADDE:  National Alliance for Law and Economic Development, created in 1993. Headed by Ignace 
Bankamwabo 
AV-INTWARI: “Alliance of the Valliant”, created 1993, led by André Nkundikije 
CNDD:  National Council for the Defence of Democracy. Founded in 1994 by Léonard Nyangoma, one 
of the founders of FRODEBU and Minister of the Interior in the Ntaryamira government. Led by 
Léonard Nyangoma 
FDD:  Forces For the Defence of Democracy, the armed branch of the CNDD. Power shared between 
the Léonard Nyangoma wing and the Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye wing. 
FNL:  National Liberation Forces, armed branch of the Palipehutu. Headed jointly by the Etienne 
Karatasi wing and the Cossan Kabura wing since 1992 
FRODEBU: Front for Democracy in Burundi. Became official in 1992 and was the winning party in the first 
presidential elections organised in Burundi in June 1993. Headed up by Jean Minani (external 
wing) and Augustin Nzojibwami (internal wing) 
FROLINA:  Front For National Liberation, created during the 80s and led by Joseph Karumba 
INKINZO:  “The Shield”, formed in 1993. Political party led by Alphonse Rugambarara 
PALIPEHUTU: Party for the Liberation of the Hutu people, under Etienne Karatasi. 
PARENA:  Party for National Recovery, created and headed up by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, ex-president of 
Burundi, in 1995. 
PIT:  Independent Workers’ Party, formed in 1993. Led by Nicépjore Ndimurukundo. 
PL:  Liberal Party, formed in 1993. Its external wing is led by Gaëtan Nikobamye and the internal 
wing by Joseph Ntidendereza. 
PP:  Party of the People, created in 1993. Headed up by Shadrack Niyonkuru (external wing) and 
Séverin Ndikumugongo (internal wing). 
PRP:  Party for the Reconciliation of the People, advocating the return of the monarchy. Created in 
1992 and led by Mathias Hitimana (external wing) and Albert Girukwishaka (internal wing). 
PSD:  Part for Social Democracy. Founded in 1993 and led by Godefroid Hakizimana 
 
 
* The Law on Political Parties in Burundi states that leaders of political parties must reside in Burundi. Leaders of so-called 
“internal wing” parties are generally recognised by the Minitry of Interior. 
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RADDES:  Rally for Democracy, Social and Economic Development. Formed in 1993 and headed by 
Joseph Nzeyimana. 
RPB:  Rally for the People of Burundi. Formed in 1993 and under the leadership of Philippe 
Nzobonariba (internal wing) and Balthazar Bigirimana (external wing). 
UPRONA:  National Union for Progress. Nationalist party created on the eve of independence in 1961 and 
led by Prince Louis Rwagasore, a hero of the independence who was assassinated in October 
1961. UPRONA was the sole party in Burundi between 1966 and 1993. The party has two wings: 
one headed by Charles Mukasi and the other by Luc Rukingama, the current Minister of 
Communication. 
The G3, G7, G8, G10 and G6 Groups 
G3:  Comprises UPRONA, the government and the National Assembly. 
G7:  The group of “Forces for Democratic Change” formed by majority Hutu or exclusively Hutu 
members: FRODEBU (external wing), CNDD, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA, PP, RPB and PL. 
G8:  Incorporates all groups known as “small Tutsi-majority parties”: PARENA, PRP, AV-
INTWARI, ABASA, PSD, INKINZO, ANADDE, and PIT. 
G6:  The G8 became the G6 on the issue of transition leadership. PARENA and ABASA refuse to 
back Epitace Bayaganakandi, the candidate for transition leadership chosen by the six other G8 
political parties. 
G10:  The G8 changed to the G10 until January 2001 on the ceasefire issue. This allowed UPRONA and 
the government to align with the smaller Tutsi parties to demand a stop to hostilities before any 
application of the accord. The coalition later dissolved over the candidacy of Epitace 
Bayaganakandi. 
Other Acronyms 
AC  Génocide “Cirimoso”: Action Against Genocide “Never Again” organises gatherings every 21st 
day of the month in memory of the massacres of October 1993 in the wake of the assassination 
of President Ndadaye. Headed up by Venant Bamboneyeho. Other 
CSAA:  Commission for the Monitoring and Application of the Arusha Accord, chaired by the UN 
Ambassador Berhanu Dinka 
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APPENDIX G 
 
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 
 
 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an 
independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, 
with over 80 staff members on five continents, 
working through field-based analysis and high-level 
advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. 
ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams 
of political analysts are located within or close by 
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence 
of violent conflict. Based on information and 
assessments from the field, ICG produces regular 
analytical reports containing practical 
recommendations targeted at key international 
decision-takers. 
ICG’s reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and printed copy to officials in 
foreign ministries and international organisations 
and made generally available at the same time via 
the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. 
ICG works closely with governments and those 
who influence them, including the media, to 
highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support 
for its policy prescriptions. 
The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures 
from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and 
the media – is directly involved in helping to bring 
ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of 
senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is 
chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; 
and its President and Chief Executive since January 
2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans. 
ICG’s international headquarters are in Brussels, 
with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York 
and Paris and a media liaison office in London. 
The organisation currently operates eleven field 
offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá, Islamabad, 
Jakarta, Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo, Sierra 
Leone and Skopje) with analysts working in over 
30 crisis-affected countries and territories 
across four continents.  
In Africa, those countries include Burundi, Rwanda, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone-
Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in 
Asia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir; in 
Europe, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the 
whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin 
America, Colombia. 
ICG raises funds from governments, charitable 
foundations, companies and individual donors. The 
following governments currently provide funding: 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
Republic of China (Taiwan), Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
Foundation and private sector donors include The 
Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of 
New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, 
The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., John D. & 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The John 
Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, 
Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, The 
Ruben & Elisabeth Rausing Trust, the Sasakawa 
Peace Foundation and the United States Institute of 
Peace. 
February 2003 
Further information about ICG can be obtained from our website: www.crisisweb.org 
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APPENDIX H 
 
ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS∗ 
 
 
AFRICA 
ALGERIA∗∗ 
The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20 
October 2000 (also available in French) 
The Civil Concord: A Peace Initiative Wasted, Africa Report 
N°31, 9 July 2001 (also available in French) 
Algeria’s Economy: A Vicious Circle of Oil and Violence, 
Africa Report N°36, 26 October 2001 (also available in French) 
BURUNDI 
The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the 
Peace Process in Burundi, Africa Report N°21, 18 April 2000 
(also available in French) 
Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties, 
Political Prisoners, and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing, 
22 June 2000 
Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom of 
the Press and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N°23, 12 July 
2000 (also available in French) 
Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, Africa 
Briefing, 27 August 2000 
Burundi: Neither War, nor Peace, Africa Report N°25, 1 
December 2000 (also available in French) 
Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New 
Negotiating Framework, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001 
(also available in French) 
Burundi: 100 Days to put the Peace Process back on Track, 
Africa Report N°33, 14 August 2001 (also available in French) 
Burundi: After Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War 
or Winning the Peace, Africa Report N°46, 24 May 2002 
(also available in French) 
The Burundi Rebellion and the Ceasefire Negotiations, Africa 
Briefing, 6 August 2002 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, Africa 
Report N°26, 20 December 2000 (also available in French) 
From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo, 
Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001 
Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention, 
Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001 
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Political Negotiation or Game 
of Bluff? Africa Report N°37, 16 November 2001 (also 
available in French) 
Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to 
Prevent Further War, Africa Report N°38, 14 December 2001 
 
 
∗ Released since January 2000. 
∗∗ The Algeria project was transferred to the Middle 
East Program in January 2002. 
Storm Clouds Over Sun City: The Urgent Need To Recast 
The Congolese Peace Process, Africa Report N°38, 14 May 
2002 (also available in French) 
The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict, 
Africa Report N°56, 24 January 2003 
RWANDA 
Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa Report 
N°15, 4 May 2000 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, 
Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001 (also available in French) 
“Consensual Democracy” in Post Genocide Rwanda: 
Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, Africa Report 
N°34, 9 October 2001 
Rwanda/Uganda: a Dangerous War of Nerves, Africa 
Briefing, 21 December 2001 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 
Countdown, Africa Report N°50, 1 August 2002 (also available 
in French) 
Rwanda At The End of the Transition: A Necessary Political 
Liberalisation, Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002 (also 
available in French) 
SOMALIA 
Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa 
Report N°45, 23 May 2002 
Salvaging Somalia’s Chance For Peace, Africa Briefing, 9 
December 2002 
SUDAN 
God, Oil & Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, 
Africa Report N°39, 28 January 2002 
Capturing the Moment: Sudan's Peace Process in the 
Balance, Africa Report N°42, 3 April 2002  
Dialogue or Destruction? Organising for Peace as the War in 
Sudan Escalates, Africa Report N°48, 27 June 2002 
Sudan’s Best Chance For Peace: How Not To Lose It, Africa 
Report N°51, 17 September 2002 
Ending Starvation as a Weapon of War in Sudan, Africa 
Report N°54, 14 November 2002 
Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudan’s 
Peace Process, Africa Report N°55, 18 December 2002 
Sudan’s Oilfields Burn Again: Brinkmanship Endangers The 
Peace Process, Africa Briefing, 10 February 2003 
WEST AFRICA 
Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy, 
Africa Report N°28, 11 April 2001 
Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, Africa Report N°35, 24 
October 2001 
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Sierra Leone: Ripe For Elections? Africa Briefing, 19 
December 2001 
Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability, Africa Report 
N°43, 24 April 2002 
Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as Usual? Africa Report 
N°49, 12 July 2002 
Liberia: Unravelling, Africa Briefing, 19 August 2002 
Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A 
Fresh Start?, Africa Briefing, 20 December 2002 
ZIMBABWE 
Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July 
2000 
Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing, 
25 September 2000 
Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a way Forward, Africa Report 
N°32, 13 July 2001 
Zimbabwe: Time for International Action, Africa Briefing, 12 
October 2001 
Zimbabwe’s Election: The Stakes for Southern Africa, Africa 
Briefing, 11 January 2002 
All Bark and No Bite: The International Response to 
Zimbabwe’s Crisis, Africa Report N°40, 25 January 2002 
Zimbabwe at the Crossroads: Transition or Conflict? Africa 
Report N°41, 22 March 2002 
Zimbabwe: What Next? Africa Report N° 47, 14 June 2002 
Zimbabwe: The Politics of National Liberation and 
International Division, Africa Report N°52, 17 October 2002 
 
ASIA 
CAMBODIA 
Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11 
August 2000 
CENTRAL ASIA 
Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia Report 
N°7, 7 August 2000 (also available in Russian) 
Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences, 
Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000 
Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report 
N°14, 1 March 2001 (also available in Russian) 
Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty and 
Social Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001 (also available in 
Russian) 
Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map, Asia 
Report N°20, 4 July 2001 (also available in Russian) 
Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability, Asia Report 
N°21, 21 August 2001 (also available in Russian) 
Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the “Island of Democracy”, 
Asia Report N°22, 28 August 2001 (also available in Russian) 
Central Asian Perspectives on the 11 September and the 
Afghan Crisis, Central Asia Briefing, 28 September 2001 
(also available in French and Russian) 
Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, Asia Report N°25, 26 
November 2001 (also available in Russian) 
Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction 
and Development, Asia Report N°26, 27 November 2001 (also 
available in Russian) 
Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, Asia Report N°30, 24 
December 2001 (also available in Russian) 
The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the 
Afghanistan Campaign, Central Asia Briefing, 30 January 2002 
(also available in Russian) 
Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, Asia 
Report N°33, 4 April 2002 (also available in Russian) 
Central Asia: Water and Conflict, Asia Report N°34, 30 May 
2002 (also available in Russian) 
Kyrgyzstan’s Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy, Asia Report 
N°37, 20 August 2002 (also available in Russian) 
The OSCE in Central Asia: A New Strategy, Asia Report 
N°38, 11 September 2002 
Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, Asia Report N°42, 
10 December 2002 
Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship, 
Asia Report N°44, 17 January 2003 
Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?, Asia 
Report N°46, 18 February 2003 
INDONESIA 
Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute, Asia Report N°6, 
31 May 2000 
Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Indonesia Briefing, 
19 July 2000 
Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia Report 
N°9, 5 September 2000 (also available in Indonesian) 
Aceh: Escalating Tension, Indonesia Briefing, 7 December 2000 
Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, Asia 
Report N°10, 19 December 2000 
Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross Human 
Rights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001 
Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20 
February 2001 (also available in Indonesian) 
Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February 
2001 
Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, 
Asia Report N°15, 13 March 2001 
Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, Indonesia 
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